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Abstract
The ultimate value of theories describing the fundamental mechanisms behind asset prices
in financial systems is reflected in the capacity of such theories to understand these sys-
tems. Although the models that explain the various states of financial markets offer substan-
tial evidence from the fields of finance, mathematics, and even physics, previous theories
that attempt to address the complexities of financial markets in full have been inadequate.
We propose an artificial double auction market as an agent-based model to study the origin
of complex states in financial markets by characterizing important parameters with an
investment strategy that can cover the dynamics of the financial market. The investment
strategies of chartist traders in response to new market information should reduce market
stability based on the price fluctuations of risky assets. However, fundamentalist traders
strategically submit orders based on fundamental value and, thereby stabilize the market.
We construct a continuous double auction market and find that the market is controlled by
the proportion of chartists, Pc. We show that mimicking the real state of financial markets,
which emerges in real financial systems, is given within the range Pc = 0.40 to Pc = 0.85;
however, we show that mimicking the efficient market hypothesis state can be generated
with values less than Pc = 0.40. In particular, we observe that mimicking a market collapse
state is created with values greater than Pc = 0.85, at which point a liquidity shortage occurs,
and the phase transition behavior is described at Pc = 0.85.
Introduction
Because of its crucial role, asset pricing has long been a subject of study in financial markets,
and a grasp of investor behavior is important to understand its fundamental mechanisms. No
theory in the fields of economics or finance explains all aspects of the price mechanism
because financial markets are extremely complex systems and are characterized by various
market states, for example, normal and abnormal states. To fully understand the price
dynamics of risky assets, we must understand the nature of the diverse states of financial
markets. The celebrated scholars Eugene F. Fama and Robert J. Shiller received the 2013
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Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for furthering understanding of the fundamental features
of asset pricing in financial markets [1].
From Efficient Market Hypothesis to Behavioral Finance
Eugene F. Fama proposed the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which is widely accepted
as the foundational economic theory of asset pricing models, including the pricing of both
underlying assets and the options related to such assets [2, 3]. In the EMH, “efficient” means
information efficiency in the market. The EMH assumes that all investors in the financial
markets are rational and that these investors cannot predict future market prices using past
financial market information due to perfect information in the market. Furthermore, Fama
focuses on the role of the capital markets, where all information about the economy is aggre-
gated, and on the financing of firms using the capital markets as an efficient channel of exter-
nal financing. With the global development of capital markets, the EMH has been the
underlying theory used in corporate finance and financial management as well as asset
pricing.
However, Robert J. Shiller proposed “behavioral finance”; according to this theory, irratio-
nal traders can predict future market prices using past information about the price movements
of risky assets or by examining psychological effects on investors [4]. Furthermore, in behav-
ioral finance, other factors such as herding and framing affect market factors such as prices,
returns, and volumes, which are important factors in asset pricing. Behavioral finance has been
developed further by a number of other economists and is well established in the mainstream
financial economics literature [5–11]. In addition, many market microstructure models have
incorporated both the EMH and behavioral finance [12–20]. Moreover, studies at the micro
level that utilize high-frequency data from financial markets have also contributed to the asset
pricing and market microstructure field [21–25].
Unfortunately, the essential assumption of the EMH is completely different from that of
behavioral finance. In other words, most of the research on asset pricing models can explain
some of the features of various aspects of the markets by making specific assumptions regard-
ing major factors, such as investor behavior and the dynamics of risky assets. Thus, a firm
grasp of the asset pricing mechanism is difficult because asset pricing models comprise a vari-
ety of independent theories; a comprehensive understanding of asset pricing is possible only by
means of integrated models that map both theories.
Toward an Integrated Asset Pricing Model: The Agent-Based Model
(ABM)
The research using agent-based models (ABM) to understand the stylized facts of asset prices
in financial markets has recently shed light on factors that (1) prompt us to question whether
the heterogeneity of investors is more important than that of representative agents in this con-
text and that (2) describe how interactions among traders affect the fundamental features of
asset prices. As a model of asset prices that considers the heterogeneity of traders, ABM has
recently emerged as an alternative approach in asset pricing models. The properties of ABM
can be distinguished from other methodologies as follows: (i) ABM provides a linkage from the
micro investor level to the macro-market level, and (ii) ABM can generate artificial data that
include different market scenarios and heterogeneous agent assumptions. Therefore, an artifi-
cial stock market has been created with various scenarios that include not only heterogeneous
agent types from zero intelligence models to multi-agent models but also various trading mech-
anisms from market-clearing systems to order-driven markets [26–44].
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To illustrate an alternative asset pricing model that reflects the various market states of real
financial markets, we develop an artificial double auction market (ADAM) trading system that
is constructed with heterogeneous agents, including fundamentalists and chartists.
Overview of Artificial Double Auction Market (ADAM)
Traditional asset pricing models in the financial system are typically characterized by one par-
tial aspect among diverse market states, but the dynamics of asset prices in the real financial
system have many aspects that can result from the heterogeneity of traders, the interactions
among them, and a complicated trading mechanism (the double auction market); thus, we use
the ADAM in our study.
In the ADAM, it is assumed that one type of stock is traded. We assume that all agents
know the other agents’ type, past price information during their investment time horizon and
the current fundamental value pft of the asset, which we assume follows the geometric Brown-
ian motion deﬁned by
ln ðpft Þ  ln ðpft1Þ ¼ t; t  Nð0; sÞ ð1Þ
where pft denotes the fundamental value at time t. The increments of ln ðpft Þ follow a normal
distribution that yields a standard deviation equal to σ for the aggregate of the increments over
integer time steps.
Fig 1 describes the schema of the trading process in the ADAM. At the first step of the trad-
ing process, an individual agent determines her own type according to switching rules among
agent types. In the ADAM, there are two heterogeneous agent types:fundamentalist and chartist.
Additionally, chartists are classified into two types according to sentiment, i.e., optimistic or pes-
simistic. We consider switching rules using transition probabilities, which consist of relative
payoff and herding. The details of the agent types are described in the Methods section. After an
Fig 1. The schema of the trading process incorporated in the ADAM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152608.g001
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agent type is determined, one randomly chosen agent forecasts the future price and determines
her order. Finally, the agent submits the order, which is determined as either a market order or
a limit order under the double auction mechanism. If an agent submits a market order to buy
(sell), this market order is matched with a limit order to sell(buy) at the best ask(bid) price, and
the market price is determined by the best ask(bid) price. If an agent submits a limit order to
buy(sell), this order is stored in a bid(ask) limit order book. This trading process can be divided
into two sub-processes: the determining agent type process and the double auction market pro-
cess. The details of the two sub-processes are also described in the Methods section.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the Methods section, we describe the
details of the ADAM. The Results section describes and discusses the results of the data gener-
ated by the model. The Discussion and Conclusions sections summarize the paper and propose
avenues for future research.
Methods
The Process of Determining the Agent Type
In the ADAM, the trading process begins by determining the agent type. We consider two het-
erogeneous agent types: the fundamentalist and the chartist. The fundamentalist agent prefers
fundamental analysis and corresponds to a fundamental trader in the real financial market
[45]. In the ADAM, fundamentalists obtain fundamental value information from fundamental
analysis. Generally, the fundamental value of a stock is calculated based on the discounted sum
of future profits or the earnings of the company issuing the stock. The movement of this funda-
mental value is a random walk and is largely unaffected by the trend in the market price. In the
ADAM, fundamental value is assumed to follow a Brownian motion, as represented by Eq 1.
Therefore, fundamentalism both stabilizes the market and randomizes market prices. Market
states driven by fundamentalists will be similar to the efficient markets proposed by Eugene F.
Fama. Unlike fundamentalists, chartists are sensitive to the trends or fashions of market prices.
Chartists are agents who prefer technical analyses using past price trends and correspond to
technical traders in the real financial market [46]. As proposed by Robert J. Shiller, a chartist is
an irrational trader and speculator who destabilizes a market. In the ADAM, a chartist is a
trend-follower who uses the trends of past prices. Additionally, chartists are classified as one of
two types: optimistic or pessimistic. Optimistic(pessimistic) chartists forecast that future prices
will be larger(smaller) than the current price.
In most of the artificial stock markets using ABM, fundamentalists and chartists are mixed
in their expectations of the spot price, which can be stochastically determined using initial
fixed parameters [35, 38, 40]. These models have the advantage of generating the market state
by varying the combinations of agent types. However, these models do not provide an adequate
description of the dynamic properties of the market microstructure when there is a change in
the agent type. To understand the dynamics of the market microstructure when there is a
change in the agent type, we segregate the fundamentalists and chartists based on their expecta-
tions, and we consider switching rules between them using transition probabilities by modify-
ing the rules of opinion dynamics from previous artificial stock market models [31, 32].
Transition probabilities include herding, which occurs in the interactions between agents, and
the profit terms of each agent type. More details regarding the switching rules are presented in
Supporting Information (S1 File).
Double Auction Market Process
After all agents determine their own type, one agent is randomly chosen to participate in trad-
ing at any time t. The chosen agent i forms an expectation about the spot price or the future
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price p^it;tþti that will prevail in the time interval (t, t + τ
i), where τi denotes the investment time
horizon of agent i. The future prices of fundamentalist, optimistic and pessimistic agents are as
follows:
p^it;tþtiðfundamentalistÞ ¼ pft 1þ N 0;
s
gf
 ! !
ð2Þ
p^it;tþtiðoptimisticÞ ¼ pt þ jN 0;
sti
gc
 
j ﬃﬃﬃﬃTip ð3Þ
p^it;tþtiðpessimisticÞ ¼ pt  jN 0;
sti
gc
 
j ﬃﬃﬃﬃTip ð4Þ
sti ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃPTi
k¼1 ðptk  pÞ2
Ti
s
ð5Þ
p ¼
Pti
k¼1 pt1k
Ti
ð6Þ
Ti ¼ t
i
Dt
ð7Þ
where pft denotes the fundamental value at time t, γf, γc denotes the risk aversion coefﬁcient of
fundamentalists and chartists, Δt denotes one simulation time step, and τi denotes the invest-
ment time horizon of agent i. We assume that γf is larger than γc. Additionally, we assume that
the τi of fundamentalists is larger than that of chartists. These assumptions reﬂect the charac-
teristic that chartists are more speculative than fundamentalists. N 0;
sti
gc
 
is a normal distribu-
tion with a mean of zero and
sti
gc
as the standard deviation. στi denotes the standard deviation of
prices during [t−τi, t). The increment of the simulation time is Δt. Chartists take the standard
deviation of future prices from the market data. Optimistic(pessimistic) agents drive the mar-
ket price to an up-trend(down-trend) based on the standard deviation of the market price.
Fundamentalists take the standard deviation of the future price with σ, which is the standard
deviation of the increments of fundamental values.
If the agent expects that the future price will be larger (smaller) than the current price, she
decides to buy(sell) one unit of the stock. However, if the agent expects the future price to be the
same as the current price, the agent does not submit an order. We assume that the agent is will-
ing to buy (sell) at a price bitðaitÞ that is lower(higher) than his expected future price p^it;tþti . bit and
ait are as follows:
bit ¼ p^it;tþtið1 kiÞ ð8Þ
ait ¼ p^it;tþtið1þ kiÞ ð9Þ
ProbðkiÞ ¼ exp ðki=sÞ=s ð10Þ
E½ki ¼ s ;Var½ki ¼ s2 ð11Þ
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where ki is distributed based on an exponential distribution. According to the double auction
mechanism, the agent selects a limit order or a market order. If bit(a
i
t) is smaller (larger) than the
best ask aqt (the best bid b
q
t ), the agent submits a limit order at the price level bit(a
i
t). The best ask
aqt (the best bid b
q
t ) means that the lowest ask(the highest bid) is listed in a limit order book at
time t. A limit order is an order to buy or sell a stock at a speciﬁc price or better and is stored in
an order book that waits for market orders. However, if bit(a
i
t) is larger (smaller) than or equal to
aqt (b
q
t ), the agent submits a market order at a
q
t (b
q
t ). A market order is an order to buy or sell a
stock at the best available price in a limit order book. When a market order is submitted in the
market, a transaction occurs. Until t + τi, limit orders that are unmatched with a market order
are removed from the order book.
At any time t, the price pt is given by the price at which a transaction, if any, occurs. If no
new transaction occurs, a proxy for the price is given by the average of aqt and b
q
t so that
pt ¼ ðaqt þ bqt Þ=2, which is a value that we call the mid-point. If no bid or ask price is listed in
the order book, a proxy for the price is given by the previously traded or quoted price. All prices
of orders must be positive, and investors can submit limit orders at any price on a prespeciﬁed
grid, as deﬁned by the tick size Δ.
All agents trade under a budget constraint, and short sales are forbidden. To prevent an
overly large change in the market price, the submission of an order that exceeds or is less than
15% of the closed price at a previous time is forbidden. We assume that the volume of submit-
ted orders is always one unit, and one simulation step, denoted by Δt, is 0.01 of time. We
assume one trading period is 100 simulation steps (= 100Δt = 1 time).
After trading is completed, all limit orders and market microstructure trajectories are writ-
ten in artificial data. By analyzing these artificial data, we can trace all of the processes of price
formation at a micro-level.
Results
We employ the ADAMmodel developed above to understand the asset pricing model on a
market microstructure level. According to the numerous results from previous works, the asset
price dynamics in a microstructure scope are characterized by several quantities, including the
return, volatility, bid-ask spread, and first gap data sets [47–58]. Here, we simulate the artificial
data sets using the ADAMmodel, which can generate significant information for understand-
ing asset price mechanisms, particularly in terms of the heterogeneity of traders. We now pro-
ceed with the simulation and analyze the data model generated. A total of 100 simulations are
performed with a different random seed. Each simulation is performed with 500 agents in
1,000,000 simulation steps(= 10,000 times). The values of the parameters used for the simula-
tions are as follows:
σ = 0.005, σ = 0.1, Δ = 0.0005, p(t = 0) = 300, pf(t = 0) = 300, γf = 1.0, γc = 0.1, and τ
i = 3
[time] for fundamentalists, and τi = 1 [time] for chartists. To protect against market distortion
in the ADAMmodel, we construct a market collapse state from which to recover to other states
by virtue of the rule that forbids trading in excess or below 15% of the market price in previous
trading periods.
Fig 2(a) depicts a large fluctuation over time, which indicates that an intermittent increase in
the number of chartists tends to deviate from the efficient market, which consists only of funda-
mentalists. Deviation from this behavior, however, supports the efficient market hypothesis. Fig
2(b)–2(d) show the temporal movement for the return time series, volatility, the bid-ask spread,
and the first gap, respectively. The bid-ask spread is calculated by the difference between the
best ask and the best bid price, and the first gap corresponds to the difference between the best
bid(ask) and the next best bid(ask). In Fig 2(b)–2(d), we find that the temporal movement of the
Understanding Financial Market States
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four variables should be caused by the ratio of chartists in the market, which has also been
found previously by both theoretical models and ABM [27, 28, 35]. Based on the results from
Fig 2, the degree of information asymmetry induced from the chartist traders plays an impor-
tant role in the transition behavior among diverse market states. In the Supporting Information,
we also calculate the statistical and dynamic properties for the four variables using detrended
fluctuation analysis and the probability density function; similar to the results from previous
works [53–61], we find that the long-range correlation observed in all of the data sets, except for
the return time series and the distribution function, follows a power-law distribution function
regardless of data set. We also verify the usefulness of the proposed model by analyzing the time
series properties of the artificial data sets generated by the ADAM.
Given the significant role that heterogeneous investors in the financial market play in creat-
ing a complicated market structure in comparison with the EMHmarket with homogeneous
traders, it is natural to expect that the degree of heterogeneity of traders is essential to generat-
ing diversity in financial market conditions. To investigate the validity of this hypothesis in
terms of understanding the fundamental features of asset prices in diverse market states, we
Fig 2. The dynamics of the agent population and the order book. From the top to the bottom, the figures show the dynamics of the type of agent in the
market, returns, volatility, the bid-ask spread and the first gap as a function of time. In the top figure, the solid red line represents the number of chartists, and
the dashed blue line represents the number of fundamentalists in the market.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152608.g002
Understanding Financial Market States
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0152608 March 31, 2016 7 / 15
analyze whether the various market states, including normal, abnormal, and collapsed, are
determined by the ratio of chartists as the source of abnormal market conditions. To analyze
the relationship between the heterogeneity of traders and market states, we divide the market
microstructure data of the ADAMmodel into a sub-data set based on the ratio of chartist trad-
ers, Pc. As Fig 3(a), 3(c) and 3(e) show, for three quantities, volatility, bid-ask spread, and the
first gap, the ratio of chartist traders, Pc, is an important factor that describes diverse market
states. In Fig 3(a), 3(c) and 3(e), we depict the probability of extreme events, Ne, and the volume
of limit order books, LOB, as a function of the Pc of those data sets. Ne is measured by the ratio
of the events exceeded by four standard deviations, 4σ. In all cases, Ne and the volume of LOB
is significantly related to Pc, which indicates that in three quantities, Pc plays an important role
in terms of determining the market state. In Fig 3(a), 3(c) and 3(e), we find that, regardless of
data set, three distinct market states are observed that define each market state as mimicking
the efficient market hypothesis(MEMH, 0  Pvolatilityc  0:45, 0  Pbidask spreadc  0:44, and
0  Pfirstgapc  0:40), mimicking the real ﬁnancial market(MRFM, 0:45 < Pvolatilityc < 0:85,
0:44 < Pbidask spreadc < 0:85, and 0:40 < P
firstgap
c < 0:85), and mimicking a market collapse
(MMC, Pc 0.85). The MRFM states are deﬁned by a threshold value larger than Ne = 0.005.
These results show that the MEMH state is similar to the efﬁcient market proposed by Fama
[2]. In an MEMH state, fundamentalists are more prevalent than chartists in the market. With
a substantial number of fundamentalists, the market price converges to a fundamental value
and reﬂects full rationality. The volume of LOB increases because of the large number of limit
orders submitted by fundamentalists in the MEMH state, indicating that fundamentalists can
play a role as liquidity providers. An MEMH state in the speciﬁc range of Pc implies that the
efﬁcient market is only an ideal state or one type of state(out of a variety of possible states) in
the ﬁnancial market. In an MEMH state, the limit order volume decreases with increases of Pc
(Fig 3(a), 3(c) and 3(e)), which implies that most market order submissions or transactions are
performed by chartists. For an MEMH state in which the fundamentalists are more dominant
than chartists in the market, the probability density function (PDF) of those variables follows a
Gaussian distribution function, which is similar to the EMH proposed by Eugene F. Fama [2]
and indicates that the market price converges to a fundamental value that should be generated
by fully rational agents based on complete information. The essential features of market prices
generated only by fundamentalists are similar to those of the EMH (see S1 File). For an MRFM
state, there is a positive correlation between the Ne of three variables and the Pc value, and the
PDF in Fig 3(b), 3(d) and 3(f) follows a power-law distribution that is observed in a real ﬁnan-
cial market, which reveals that an increasing number of chartists generates extreme events that
are frequently found in the real ﬁnancial markets. This ﬁnding indicates that the prices in an
MRFM state have trends or fashions and deviate from efﬁcient market states, as proposed by
Robert J. Shiller [4]. In other words, because there are more chartists than fundamentalists in
the market, the market price becomes largely separated from the fundamental value (random
walk). We also ﬁnd that the volume of the limit order book (LOB) and Pc shows a negative rela-
tionship in Fig 3(a), 3(c) and 3(e). In an MMC state, we ﬁnd that Ne drops to zero due to the
shortage of transactions, and the volume of LOB is almost zero. According to these results, the
chartists should behave as liquidity takers and can sharply increase the liquidity risk. An MMC
state created by chartists will ultimately lead to a market collapse because of the liquidity
shortage.
To analyze the characteristics of the limit order book for the three distinct market states, we
show snapshots of the LOB of each state. Fig 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) show the LOB of the MEMH
(Pc = 0.08), MRFM(Pc = 0.62) and MMC(Pc = 0.85) states, respectively. In Fig 4(a), 4(b) and 4
(c), we find that the bid-ask spread and the width between limit orders increase as Pc increases;
Understanding Financial Market States
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Fig 3. Market states according to Pc—(a)(c)(e). There are Ne, and LV(limit order book volume) as a function of Pc. Ne denotes the number of extreme
events normalized by the number of total events. We define a financial crisis event as a value larger than 4 σ. σ is the standard deviation of the given time
series. A blue filled circle depictsNe, and a red filled square depicts the limit order book volume. According to Pc, we classify the market into three distinct
Understanding Financial Market States
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thus, Pc is the smallest in the MEMH state and has the largest value in the MMC state, which is
characterized by a liquidity shortage or liquidity evaporation. In Fig 4(b), we find that a suitable
ratio of chartists increases the liquidity of transactions among agents and that it will reduce the
liquidity risk. Thus, the stability of the financial market should be controlled by the ratio of
chartists in the entire population of traders. Previous empirical studies have reported that the
bid-ask spread in a financial crisis is larger than it is before the crisis [50, 51]. It has been
reported that specialists in the NYSE (New York Stock Exchange) had trouble executing trades
because of a dramatic shortage of limit orders on Black Monday, October 19,1987 [52]. Our
model is consistent with these empirical findings, including the liquidity shortage on Black
Monday.
The standard deviation of volatility, the bid-ask spread and the first gap as a function of Pc
increase and have peak points at approximately 0.85 (Fig 5). All of the maximum standard
deviation values of these quantities are normalized by 1. When Pc is greater than 0.85, the stan-
dard deviation of the three quantities dramatically decreases and is close to zero in Fig 5. Our
results suggest that the behavior of LOB appears to be a transition from an alive state to a col-
lapsed state at approximately Pc = 0.85, which is similar to the phase transition behavior
described by previous research [62].
We observe various stylized facts in asset returns and market microstructures such as power-
law tails, a long memory of volatility, and first gap and aggregational Gaussianity [53–61]. To
confirm the effect of the chartists, we perform an analysis of a homogeneous equilibriummarket
that consists of only fundamentalists. The results show that market prices converge to the fun-
damental value, and the market state does not deviate from the MEMH state during the simula-
tion. MRFM, MMC and stylized facts are not observed in the homogeneous equilibrium
market. The details of the analysis of the stylized facts and the results of the analysis of a homo-
geneous equilibriummarket can be found in the Supporting Information (S1 File).
Discussion and Conclusion
Understanding asset pricing is a crucial issue in financial markets; however, because there is no
adequate theory to explain it that includes all aspects of the price mechanisms, most of the the-
ories reflect only the partial features of the manner in which asset prices are determined by the
investment strategies of agents.
Indeed, when applying important elements, including the heterogeneity of traders and the
double auction market as the trading system, to an artificial market, one must also consider the
diversity of market states. In this study, we have suggested the ADAMmodel to illustrate the
diversity of the financial markets from an efficient market to behavioral finance. The ADAM
model consists of heterogeneous traders, including fundamentalists and chartists, and provides
a differentiated framework compared with previous ABMs. Our key finding is that the diversity
of the financial market, including the MEMH, MRFM, and MMC, is determined primarily by
the ratio of chartists, Pc, among all of the traders in the market.
The ADAM framework developed herein offers explanations and raises questions that can
deepen our understanding of asset pricing models in financial markets. For example, although
the ADAM cannot be considered a multi-asset pricing model, the framework we develop can
states: MEMH(Mimicking Efficient Market Hypothesis), MRFM(Mimicking Real Financial Market), or MMC(Mimicking Market Collapse). (b)(d)(f) There are
CDFs(Cumulative Distribution Functions) of volatility, the bid-ask spread and the first gap in an MEMH state and the entire state. A red blank circle represents
the CDF of an entire state. The blue-black square represents the CDF of an MEMH state. A dashed black line represents an exponential distribution function.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152608.g003
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Fig 4. Snapshots of limit order books in three market states. The figure shows snapshots of the limit
order books in the MEMH, MRFM and MMC states. A negative volume indicates the volume of asks. The bid-
ask spread is defined by the difference between the best ask, which is the lowest ask among limit orders, and
the best bid, which is the highest bid among limit orders.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152608.g004
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explain the diversity of financial market states and can provide a framework with which to
address the role of the heterogeneity of agents.
In summary, our findings argue that many aspects of market states can be explored numeri-
cally using the ABM if we combine the heterogeneity of traders and the double auction market
as trading systems, thus creating the potential for a more in-depth understanding of financial
markets.
Supporting Information
S1 File. More details of transition probabilities and additional result of analysis related to
finding of some stylized facts in financial market using ADAM.
(PDF)
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